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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: A COMMENTARY
ON THE IMPACT OF HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS ON STUDENTS
WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Classroom performance has become a dominant influence in the de-
velopment of all students' self-esteem. Unfortunately, for many stu-
dents with learning disabilities, their performances in the classroom
result in anything but a boost in self-esteem. It follows that schools
should encourage students with learning disabilities to spend time
achieving successes outside of the classroom environment in which
they typically struggle. Schools should welcome the opportunity to
inspire and challenge students with learning disabilities on playing
fields, courts, tracks, and gymnasiums, especially now, as participation
in interscholastic athletic competition has become a hallmark of the
American high school experience. Sadly though, that experience is
too often foreclosed to students, who by reason of their immutable
learning disabilities, fail to meet athletic eligibility criteria.
Academic and age eligibility requirements are common prerequi-
sites to interscholastic competition. Generally, students who have not
achieved eligibility status are precluded from participation in high
school athletic programs. Typical state high school athletic association
regulations including the following: (i) eligible students may not reach
the age of nineteen prior to the summer before school opens;' (ii)
eligible students may not have completed more than eight semesters
of high school; 2 (iii) eligible students have not changed schools with-
out a corresponding move by their parents or person with whom they
were living for at least 30 calendar days during the their last semester.3
Through a survey of prominent case law and empirical studies this
note argues that interscholastic athletic associations must not only en-
gage in individualized inquiries as to the essentiality of eligibility re-
quirements as applied to student requesting the waiver, but also
should consider the social and emotional benefits of interscholastic
1. Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1994).
2. McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 455 (6th Cir. 1997).
3. See Michigan High School Athletic Association guide for student-athletes, available at
www.mhsaa.com (last visited April 28, 2008).
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competition for students with learning disabilities. Part one will dis-
cuss the nature of learning disabilities; part two will review the case
law regarding the disparate impact such regulations have on students
with learning disabilities; and part three will evaluate the reasonable-
ness of eligibility requirement waivers.
1I. THE NATURE OF LEARNING DISABILITIES EXPLORED
During the 2000-2001 school year, approximately 2.9 million stu-
dents between the ages of six and twenty-one were identified as hav-
ing one or more learning disabilities. This figure represents 50 percent
of all students who received special education services that year, or
roughly 5 percent of the entire school population.4
A. Learning Disabilities Defined
The term learning disability was coined more than forty years ago,
but considerable controversy surrounding its definition exists in the
field today.5 Most scholars have agreed that learning disabilities: (i)
encompass a heterogeneous group of disorders; (ii) have a neurologi-
cal basis and are intrinsic to the individual; (iii) are characterized by a
discrepancy between ability and achievement; and (iv) are not a result
of other disorders or problems, however individuals with learning dis-
abilities may require other special needs as well. 6
Without a more pithy description available, the definition of learn-
ing disability most often cited is the federal definition promulgated by
the Department of Education, which defines "specific learning disabil-
ity" as a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes
involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written,
that may manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen, think, speak,
read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.7 Under the federal
regulations, specific learning disabilities include such conditions as
perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dys-
lexia, and developmental aphasia.8 However, the term does not in-
4. MARILYN FRIEND, SPECIAL EDUCATION CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES FOR SCHOOL PRO-
FESSIONALS 167 (Virginia Lanigan ed., Pearson Education, Inc. 2005).
5. Id. at 166.
6. Id.
7. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(10) (2006).
8. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(10). Today, dyslexia, which means developmental word blindness, is
the commonly used term to describe students with any serious reading difficulty. Dyslexia
causes students to have difficult developing phonemic awareness, which makes it difficult to link
speech sounds to letters. This leads to slow labored reading characterized by frequent starts and
stops, multiple mispronunciations, and problems with comprehension. FRIEN., supra note 4. at
174.
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clude a learning problem that is primarily the result of visual, hearing,
or motor disabilities, of mental retardation, of emotional disturbance,
or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage.9
B. Causes and Academic Indicia
The causes of learning disabilities are unknown, though some scien-
tists have separated the possible causes into two categories, environ-
mental and physiological.' 0 Physiological causes include brain injury,
heredity, and chemical imbalance." Many researchers link learning
disabilities to both prenatal and postnatal brain injury, one of the ear-
liest proposed causes.12 While others believe that the physiological
cause of learning disabilities is biochemical based on the successful
use of medication, particularly in children with attention deficit disor-
der.' 3 Genetic research of twins and siblings supports the heritability
of learning disabilities; though, not surprisingly, critics of the heredity
theory note that parents and children with the same learning disabili-
ties are often exposed to the same environmental factors.14
In the classroom, students with learning disabilities typically exhibit
weakness in one or more areas of cognition, such as attention, percep-
tion, memory, or processing, despite the fact that they have average or
above-average intelligence.' 5 Students with learning disabilities are
most commonly recognized by their teachers as having significant aca-
demic difficulties in reading, language, and mathematics.' 6 These stu-
dents may also experience behavior problems including excessive-out
of seat behavior, talk-outs, and physical and verbal aggression, though
it unclear whether such behaviors are related to the learning disability
or the result of academic frustration.' 7 Moreover, it can be difficult to
attribute the student's behavior problems to the learning disability it-
9. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(10).
10. FRIEND, supra note 4, at 168.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 169.
14. Id. Some researchers who attribute learning disabilities to various environmental factors
further suggest that children who live in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods can be
placed at a greater risk of developing learning disabilities due to inadequate medical services,
poor nutrition, lack of stimulation, and adverse emotional climates.
15. Id. at 171-73. Learning disabled students may often have trouble focusing on important
stimuli in their environments, and they may have difficulty with long and short term memory.
Learning disabilities can also effect a student's metacognition, the student's ability to think
about thinking. As a result, students with learning disabilities may lack the ability to actively
consider how newly learned information relates to previously stored information, or how to ap-
ply stored knowledge in a novel learning experience.
16. Id. at 173.
17. Id. at 178.
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self, namely because a significant number of learning disabled stu-
dents have comorbid learning disabilities (those occurring
simultaneously) as well as attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder,
ADHD.'8
C. Social and Emotional Characteristics of Students with
Learning Disabilities
It is estimated that as many as 75 percent of students with learning
disabilities manifest some type of social skill deficit that distinguishes
them from their non-learning disabled peers.' 9 Some researchers
have concluded that academic skill deficits, which are the major defin-
ing variable of learning disabilities, were a significant factor in the way
social functioning was perceived. 20 According to teachers and peers,
learning disabled students' own perceptions about their academic in-
competence appeared to be associated with the student's lower social
status, greater rejection, reduced acceptance, and less interaction. 2 1
Furthermore, students with learning disabilities perceived their social
functioning to be adversely affected by a lack of competence in non-
verbal communication and deficient social problem solving.2 2
Not surprisingly, when evaluated by their peers, learning disabled
students were generally defined by reduced acceptance and greater
rejection. 23 Such classifications appeared to result in less interaction
and lower status for students with learning disabilities, which conse-
quently, appeared relative to their being less popular, less often se-
lected as friends, and viewed as less cooperative by their average
achieving peers.24 Researchers also note that negative social evalua-
tions can also be attributed to the learning disabled student's per-
ceived lack of communicative competence, both verbal and nonverbal,
and her reduced ability to demonstrate emphatic behavior.25 Sadly,
18. Id.
19. Kenneth A. Kavale & Stephen R. Fornes, Social Skill Deficits and Learning Disabilities: A
Meta-Analvsis, 29 Journal of Learning Disabilities 226 (May 1996). Kavale and Fornes, using the
methods of meta-analysis, surveyed 152 studies to explore the nature of social skill deficits
among students with learning disabilities. Social competence is defined as the ability to perceive
and interpret social situations, generate appropriate social responses, and initiate a strategic be-
havioral response.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Due in part to their poor self concept and lack of self esteem, researchers note that
learning disabled students often harbor general feelings of inferiority, which contributes to their
negative perception of social functioning.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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the negative evaluations that learning disabled students received from
their peers was greatly demonstrated through avoidance behaviors."
In addition to any deficits in social competence which learning dis-
abled students exhibit, some researchers have found, though not
wholly unexpectedly, that learning disabled students had less positive
views about school, were more motivated to avoid work, and exper-
ienced greater feelings of alienation when compared to their non-
learning disabled peers.27 Interestingly, one study indicated that ado-
lescent students with learning disabilities were more likely than non-
learning disabled students to believe that the school's purpose is both
to prepare them for jobs that result in wealth and luxuries and to
teach them to persist "when things become difficult." 2 8 Based on
those statements and the reported feelings of alienation, researchers
note that one could rationally conclude that "school seriously fails to
meet the expectations of students with learning disabilities."2 9
Nevertheless, despite these internal struggles, many students with
learning disabilities are quite well-adjusted and well-accepted by their
peers.30 Researchers explain these differences in social competences
to the students' individual learning environments. 3 ' Not surprisingly,
students excel in classrooms where teachers emphasize abilities and
create a supportive social environment; conversely, student perceive
themselves in a negative light where teachers focus solely on students'
problems. 32
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIEs ACT AND ITS
APPLICATION TO INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETICS: A
SURVEY OF PROMINENT CASE LAW
Student athletes with disabilities, who have failed to meet eligibility
requirements, may seek legal relief either under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or Title II of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act ("ADA") as both prohibit discrimination on the basis of disa-
26. Id.
27. Barbara M. Fulk et al.. Motivation and Self-Regulation: A Comparison of Students with
Learning and Behavior Problems, 19 Remedial and Special Education 300 (Sept.-Oct. 1998).
This study investigated the motivational characteristics of students with learning disabilities, stu-
dents with emotional or behavioral disorders, and students with average achievement. The
learning disabled middle school students who participated in this study spent large portions of
their school day mainstreamed in general education classes.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. FRIEND, supra note 4, at 177.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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bility. Section 504 prohibits any programs receiving federal financial
assistance from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disa-
bility; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act broadened the
reach of section 504 to prohibit "public entities," which may or may
not receive federal aid, from discriminating against individuals with
disabilities.3 Because the courts have well established that the pur-
pose, scope and governing standards of the acts are quite similar, the
analysis of claims brought under the ADA "roughly parallels" those
brought under the Rehabilitation Act. 3 4
A. Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Prior to the ADA's enactment in 1990, the Congressional findings
indicated that 43 million Americans have one or more physical or
mental disability, and not surprisingly, this number is increasing at the
population as a whole is growing older.3 5 Congress also found that
"individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discrimi-
natory effects of architectural, transportation and communication bar-
riers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications
to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards
and criteria, segregation, and regulation to lesser services, programs,
activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities." 36
In response to the invidious maltreatment and segregation of indi-
viduals with disabilities, Congress enacted the American with Disabili-
ties Act, as one of the most comprehensive civil rights statutes in
history. Further recognizing that the policies and practices of State
and local governments were not immune from challenge, Congress
drafted Title II of the ADA to provide that "no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity."37
33. 29 U.S.C. 794 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). Enforcement remedies, procedures, and
rights under Title 11 are the same as those under Section 504. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000). Moreo-
ver, Title II's corresponding regulations promulgated by the Attorney General must be consis-
tent with the regulations relating to Section 504. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2000).
34. See e.g. McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d at 460.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). A public entity refers to any state or local government, as well
as any department, agency, special purpose district, or any other instrumentality of a State or
local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000).
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The legal definition of "disability" is a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities, a
record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an
impairment.38 This federal definition expressly includes "specific
learning disabilities" as an impairment and learning as a major life
activity. Nevertheless, while an individual may have a bona fide disa-
bility, only qualified individuals with disabilities may seek relief under
the ADA.
For purposes of receiving protection under the ADA, "a qualified
individual with disability" refers to a person with a disability who,
with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or prac-
tices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the es-
sential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the partic-
ipation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.9
Consequently, legal disputes regularly hinge on whether an individual
meets essential eligibility requirements, and is thereby entitled to cov-
erage. A public entity is not required to make modifications that fun-
damentally alter the nature of the service, program or activity, or pose
an undue hardship on the operation of the program.t 1 Notably, a
"qualified individual with a disability" may nevertheless be excluded
from coverage if he poses a direct threat to the health and safety of
others. 41
Quite significantly for student athletes with disabilities, Title II fur-
ther prohibits public entities from imposing or applying eligibility cri-
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2000). The phrase major life activi-
ties also includes functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, see-
ing, hearing, speaking, breathing, and working. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2) (2006). The phrase
physical or mental impairment also includes, but is not limited to, such contagious and noncon-
tiguous diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental
retardation, emotional illness, HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculo-
sis, drug addition, and alcoholism. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1)(ii) (2006).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000). While the Rehabilitation Act, unlike the ADA, does not
provide a statutory definition, case law interpreting § 504 supports a similar definition. See e.g.
Southeastern Comty Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (holding that under § 504 an other-
wise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirement's in spite of his
handicap); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987) (holding that
under section 504 courts must also consider whether any reasonable accommodations would
enable a disabled individual to perform the essential functions of her job.)
40. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 32.13(a) (2006). Undue hardships on the op-
eration of a program may include financial or administrative burdens on the grantee of federal
financial assistance under section 504. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2000): Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88. A direct threat means a signifi-
cant risk to the health and safety of others that cannot be eliminated by modifying the policies,
practices or procedures or by providing auxiliary aids.
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teria that screen out or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities
from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, un-
less such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the
service, program, or activity being offered. 42 This provision is signifi-
cant as it creates a claim based on a disparate impact theory. Eligibil-
ity requirements are inherently neutral rules, and students with
disabilities often have difficulty establishing traditional discrimination
on the basis of disability.43
B. Essentiality of Eligibility Requirements: Pottgen and its Progeny
As previously noted, age eligibility requirements are heavily con-
tested by student athletes with learning disabilities and, not surpris-
ingly, courts vary in their treatment of such cases. Because federal law
protects only those students who meet the essential eligibility require-
ments, with or without reasonable modifications, an inquiry into
which eligibility criteria are in fact essential is required.44
Nearly fifteen years ago, in the seminal case Pottgen v. Missouri
State Athletic Association, the Eighth Circuit rejected the student ath-
lete's argument that the application of the nineteen year old age limi-
tation violated Section 504 and the ADA. 4 5 The student, Ed Pottgen,
repeated two grades in elementary school prior to being diagnosed
with several learning disabilities. He participated in interscholastic
baseball for three years in high school, and planned on playing his
senior year as well. As a consequence of repeating two grades,
Pottgen turned nineteen 35 days prior to Julyl, the cut off date for
eligibility. He petitioned the athletic association for a hardship excep-
tion to the eligibility requirement on the basis of his disability, but the
association denied the waiver. 46
In finding that the age restriction constituted an essential eligibility
requirement, the court listed the following purposes of the eligibility
requirement: "[a]n age limit helps reduce the competitive advantage
flowing to teams using other athletes; protects younger athletes from
42. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2006).
43. See Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d. 1026, 1033-34 (concluding that
the age limitation excludes student solely by reason of their dates of birth); Reaves v. Mills, 904
F. Supp. 120, 122 (W.D. N.Y. 1995) (holding that the maximum age requirement did not violate
the ADA as it is based upon a students age, not her mental abilities.); and Rhodes v. Ohio High
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F. Supp. 584, 589 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that the eight consecutive
semester rule is similarly neutral to the maximum age rule, and therefore does not discriminate
on the basis of disability, but rather on the basis of time, measured in semesters.)
44. Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Athletic Ass'n.. 40 F.3d at 931.
45. Id. at 929-31.
46. Id.
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harm; discourages student athletes from delaying their education to
gain athletic maturity; and prevents over-zealous coaches from engag-
ing in repeated red-shirting to gain a competitive advantage."4 7 The
court decided that such purposes were of "immense importance" to an
interscholastic athletic program, and therefore considered the age lim-
itation as an essential eligibility requirement. 48 Because Ed Pottgen
could not meet this essential requirement without a waiver, which the
majority found to be an unreasonable modification, he was not a qual-
ified individual with a disability, and his challenged failed. 49
The significance of the Pottgen majority decision, and consequently,
what sparked the dissenting opinion, is found in the majority's inter-
pretation and application of the ADA's individualized inquiry re-
quirement. The majority in Pottgen held that the individualized
inquiry is inappropriate during the court's initial determination as to
whether an eligibility requirement is "essential."o5 1 The majority in-
stead concluded that an individualized inquiry as to the "essential eli-
gibility requirements" is not required under the ADA because "[a]
public entity could never know the outer boundaries of its 'services,
programs or activities; [a] requirement could be deemed essential for
one person with a disability but immaterial for another similarly, but
not identically, situated individual." 5' The majority goes on to explain
that if an individualized inquiry were applied in Pottgen's case, the
athletic association would have to show the "essential nature of each
allegedly offending program requirement as it applies to the com-
plaining individual." In determining that the ADA imposes no such
duty, the majority found that such an individualized approach at this
stage "flies in the face of the [Supreme] Court's statement that
'[a]ccomodation is not reasonable if it either imposes undue financial
and administrative burdens [on the public entity] or requires a funda-
mental alteration of [the] program.' "52
Notably, the dissent in Pottgen took the opposite position, and con-
cluded that the majority, by reciting the rule's general justifications
and mechanically applying it across the board, erroneously failed to
evaluate the eligibility requirement as it was applied to the individual
47. Id. at 929. The term "red-shirting" refers to a practice in which a player is deliberately
held back a year for the purposes of allowing the student to gain physical and athletic maturity.
See also McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d at 456.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 930.
50. Id. at 930-31.
51. Id. at 931.
52. Id.
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athlete.53 The dissent contended that because the ADA requires
courts to conduct an individualized inquiry as to whether the person is
a "qualified" for statutory coverage, the proper analysis of essential
eligibility requirements is one which evaluates the rule's operation in
the individual case of each student. 54 Accordingly, the dissent found
that it was not unreasonable for the athletic association to waive the
age eligibility requirements in Pottgen's case; namely because such a
waiver would not fundamentally alter the high school baseball compe-
tition in Missouri.55 After conducting an individualized inquiry, the
dissent concluded that there was "no contention whatever that Ed
Pottgen deliberately repeated the first and third grades in order to
make himself eligible to play baseball another year at age nineteen,"
and there was no evidence that Pottgen posed a threat to the health
and safety of others, as he was not appreciably larger than the average
eighteen year old boy.56 Therefore, in the dissent's opinion, the ath-
letic association's goals of discouraging the delay of education to gain
competitive advantage and protecting competition and safety were
certainly not thwarted by waiving the age requirement in Pottgen's
case: "[i]f a rule can be modified without doing violence to its essential
purposes.. .I do not believe that it can be 'essential' to the nature of
the program or activity to refuse to modify the rule."57
In sum, if the eligibility requirement is deemed essential, the stu-
dent athlete with a learning disability may nevertheless qualify for
coverage under the ADA if she can meet the requirement with a rea-
sonable modification. Because the only modifications that would en-
able an athlete to meet such requirements are waiving the eligibility
requirements themselves, courts are further pressed to determine if
waivers fundamentally alter the nature of the athletic program, and
thus, are unreasonable. When deciding whether a waiver is reasona-
ble, courts consider the impact of the regulation on purposes and
objectives of interscholastic competition. Consequently, because most
courts agree that eligibility requirements advance legitimate goals of
interscholastic competition, some courts have been reluctant to issue
injunctions estopping associations from enforcing them.58 Though the
53. Id. 931-32.
54. Id. at 932. With respect to the majority's contention that an individualized inquiry is not
appropriate, the dissent responded by noting that it "find[s] no such principle in the words of the
statute."
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 932-33.
58. See Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F. Supp. 984, 593 (N.D. Ohio 1996);
Reaves v. Mills, 904 F. Supp. 120, 122-23 (W.D. N.Y. 1995);
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Eight Circuit majority in Pottgen glossed over the reasonableness of
waivers inquiry, the Sixth Circuit has delved into the issue at length.
In Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc., the
Sixth Circuit followed the Pottgen majority reasoning to find that a
waiver of the age restriction fundamentally altered the nature of the
athletic program for two reasons. First, athletic programs typically co-
ordinate competition between students aged fourteen to eighteen, and
a removal of the age restriction would inject older, more physically
mature students into the program. Second, athletic associations and
coaches were not in the position to determine whether an individual
athlete's age posses an unfair competitive advantage. 9 The athletes in
Sandison were nineteen-year-old twins with learning disabilities who,
after three years of high school competition, were precluded from par-
ticipating on the high school cross county team their senior year.6 1o
Responding to the students' argument that introducing their aver-
age athletic skills into track and cross-country competition would not
fundamentally alter the nature of the program, the Sixth Circuit said
that requiring coaches and physicians to determine the competitive
advantage of an over-age athlete is "near-impossible" and unquestion-
ably poses an undue burden on the athletic department.6 ' The Michi-
gan High School Athletic Association (MHSAA) expert explained
that the following five factors should be considered when determining
if an athlete poses an unfair competitive advantage due to age: chron-
ological age, physical maturity, athletic experience, athletic skill level,
and mental ability to process sports strategy. 62 The court concluded
that the competitive advantage determination is unreasonable as it
must also be made "relative to the skill level of each participating
member of the opposing teams and the team as a unit" and "relative
to the skill level of the would-be athlete whom the older student dis-
placed from the team."
The Sixth Circuit in Sandison also observed what it called a "signifi-
cant peculiarity" in characterizing a waiver of the maximum age limi-
tation as a reasonable accommodation of the athlete learning
disability. 64 Noting that reasonable accommodations traditionally op-
erate to overcome the disability so that an individual's disability no
longer prevents them from participation, the court failed to see how
59. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 64 F.3d at 1035.
60. Id. at 1028.
61. Id. at 1035.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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the waiver of the age restriction, which "merely removes the age ceil-
ing as an obstacle," is directed at helping the student overcome his
disability.65
C. Cases Calling for an Individualized Inquiry-a Welcomed
Retreat from Pottgen
Two years after its decision in Sandison, the Sixth Circuit struck
down a challenge to the eight semester cap on eligibility in McPherson
v. Michigan Athletic Association.66 The requirement at issue in Mc-
Pherson provided that a student who has been enrolled in grades nine
through twelve, inclusive, for more than eight semesters may not com-
pete in interscholastic athletics.67 As a threshold matter, the Court
found that the eight semester rule was a essential requirement to the
athletic program as it served largely the same purposes of the maxi-
mum age limitation rule: "both are intended to limit the level of ath-
letic experience and range of skills of the players in order to create a
more even playing field for the competitors, to limit the size and phys-
ical maturity of high school athletes for the safety of all participants,
and to afford players who observe the age-limit rule and the eight
semester rule, presumably athletes of less maturity, a fair opportunity
to compete for playing time." 68
Notably, the principal difference between the facts in McPherson
and those in Sandison was that the MHSAA regulations expressly
provided for a waiver of the eight semester eligibility rule at issue in
McPherson.69 Thus, the McPherson Court faced a novel argument on
appeal: if the interscholastic athletic association is permitted to make
waiver determinations in some situations, such a practice is not "near
impossible" much less unduly burdensome, and therefore a reasona-
65. Id.
66. 119 F.3d at 456-57. The student athlete in McPherson originally entered the eleventh
grade in 1992, but had to repeat that grade during the 1993-1994 school year. Consequently, the
1993-1994 school year represented McPherson's seventh and eighth semesters in high school.
During 1993-1994 school year, McPherson first participated in varsity basketball; throughout
previous grades in high school, McPherson failed to meet the grade point average requirements.
In September 1994, his ninth semester in high school, McPherson was diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and a seizure disorder. He was subsequently classified as having
a specific learning disability. After being denied a waiver of the eight semester rule, the student
filed suit in federal court alleging violations of the ADA and Section 504.
67. Id. at 455.
68. Id. at 460-61.
69. Id. at 455. The waiver provision stated: "[e]xcept for the eligibility rule with regard to age,
the Executive Committee shall have the authority to set aside the effect of any regulation gov-
erning eligibility of students or the competition between schools when in its opinion the rule
fails to accomplish the purpose for which it is intended, or when the rule works an undue hard-
ship upon the student or school."
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ble modification under the ADA. 70 The Court ultimately rejected this
proposition, instead finding that that MHSAA's "determination that a
rule may sometimes be waived under some circumstances does not
mean that the rule, as a general matter, is not 'necessary' to the suc-
cessful functioning of a sports program."71
The court did however find "superficial appeal" in the student's ar-
gument, and noted that it was "not insensible. . .to the plaintiff's con-
tention that the existence of past waivers make it inherently
reasonable to require the MHSAA to grant a waiver in this case." 72
However, the court distinguished the student's situation in McPherson
from the wavier cases contemplated by the MHSAA, and held that
because the athlete's learning disability was diagnosed after his eight
semester eligibility expired, a waiver of the eight semester cap, in the
instant case, was unreasonable as it would "directly threaten one of
the fundamentally purposes of the eight semester rule; namely the
avoidance of red-shirting." 73
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the majority's decision in Mc-
Pherson is that it contemplates the effect of the waiver as individually
applied to the student with the learning disabilities. The court stated:
"to allow a waiver under these circumstances would create a highly
unfavorable precedent, in which a school district can have control
over a player's eligibility, find that player to be ineligible, and then
later, when he has physically and athletically matured, find him eligi-
ble." 7 4 The Seventh Circuit aptly noted that upon close reading of
McPherson it becomes apparent that the Sixth Circuit did in fact en-
gage in an individualized assessment as to the reasonableness of a
waiver: "[t]o characterize McPherson as espousing the rigid approach
of the Eighth Circuit majority in Pottgen, it is necessary to ignore the
court's individualized assessment of the risk of redshirting."75
The shift away from the majority's decision in Pottgen further be-
comes evident in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Washington v. Indi-
ana High School Athletic Association.76 In that case, decided two
years after McPherson, the Seventh Circuit addressed a similar chal-
lenge to the Indiana High School Athletic Association's (IHSAA)
eight semester eligibility rule.7 7 Of significance is the fact that the
70. Id. at 461.
71. Id.
72. Id. at462-63.
73. Id. at 463.
74. Id.
75. Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840, 851 (7th Cir. 1999).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 842-43.
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MHSAA's rule at issue in McPherson prohibited students who have
been enrolled in high school for more than eight semesters from par-
ticipating in athletics, while the IHSAA rule at issue in Washington
prohibited students from participating eight semesters after they com-
mence ninth grade, regardless of whether the student was actually en-
rolled for the full eight semesters.7 8 In other words, under the Indiana
rule, the student's eligibility period continues to run when a student
drops out of school, and under the Michigan rule the eligibility period
ceases to run for a student who has dropped out of school.79
The Washington case involved a challenge to the IHSAA's eight se-
mester eligibility rule by Washington, a student who entered high
school at the beginning of the second semester of the 1994-95 aca-
demic year."1 Washington completed his first two years of high school
with failing grades and without having been tested for learning disabil-
ities." Early in 1996-97 school year, Washington's counselor advised
him that he should drop out of high school, and consequently, Wash-
ington took that advice.8 2 In the summer of 1997 at a basketball tour-
nament, Washington met the coach of his former high school's
basketball team, and with the coach's encouragement, he reentered
high school that fall.8 3 In January 1998, at the request of the coach,
who was also a teacher at the school and Washington's academic men-
tor, Washington was tested for, and was subsequently identified as
having a learning disability.8 4
Under the IHSAA's rule, because Washington entered the ninth
grade in the second semester of 1994-95, was ineligible for participa-
tion in interscholastic athletics during the second semester of the
1998-99 school year, as that marked his ninth semester in high
school. 5 Like most athletic associations regulations, the IHSAA pro-
vided for two exemptions to the eight semester rule: one pertaining to
students who were injured and received no academic credit for the
semester, and the other, a traditional "hardship waiver" which permit-
ted the IHSAA not to enforce a rule if such enforcement in the partic-
ular case would not serve to accomplish the purpose of the rule, the
spirit of the rule would not be violated, and there is a showing of un-
78. Id. at 852.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 842.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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due hardship.86 The IHSAA denied Washington's request for a
waiver of the eight semester rule, reasoning that permitting a waiver
in Washington's case would open up the flood gates for eligibility
exceptions.87
In considering whether Washington was otherwise qualified, and in
particular, whether a waiver of the eight semester rule was reasonable,
the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the majority approach in
Pottgen, and cited the analysis of Chief Justice Arnold in the dissent in
Pottgen as well as the en banc majority in McPherson as being more
compatible with congressional intent: "[T]he better view is to ask
whether waiver of the rule in the particular case at hand would be so
at odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a funda-
mental and unreasonable change."88 The Seventh Circuit found the
majority's view in Pottgen unpersuasive and unworkable, noting that
"[t]o require a focus on the general purposes behind a rule without
considering the effect an exception for a disabled individual would
have on those purposes would negate the reason for requiring reason-
able exceptions."
Significantly, several courts have followed the reasoning articulated
by the Pottgen dissent, and consequently, have issued injunctions
enjoining athletic associations from applying eligibility rules on
student athletes with disabilities.89 Other courts have also applied an
86. Id. at 842.
87. Id. at 843-44.
88. Id. at 850. The court also noted that commentators have overwhelmingly agreed that
individualized inquiries are necessary under an ADA analysis.
89. See Denin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 668-69
(D. Conn.) judgment vacated and appeal dismissed as moots, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting a
preliminary injunction enjoining association from applying maximum age rule because "it would
be an anathema to the goals of the Rehabilitation Act to decline to require an individualized
analysis of the purposes behind the age requirement as applied to the student); Johnson v. Flor-
ida High School Athletic Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 585-86 (M.D.Fla. 1995) judgment vacated on
other grounds, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997) (requiring an individual analysis of the require-
ment, its underlying purpose, and the manner in which allowing participation would affect those
purposes and concluding that where the particular student was not a safety hazard, was an aver-
age player and had les experience that other players, a waiver of the age rule does not funda-
mentally alter the nature of the athletic program); Booth v. Univ. Interscholastic Athletic League,
1990 WL 484414 (W.D. Texas) (granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of 19-
year-old eligibility rule noting that the athletic association's blanket policy against individually
evaluating the risk posed by 19-year-old athletes undermines the objectives of the Rehabilitation
Act without advancing the policies behind the 19-year-old eligibility rule); Univ. Interscholastic
Athletic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App. 1993) (finding that waiver of 19-year-
old maximum age rule was a reasonable accommodation); Hamilton v. West Virginia Secondary
Sch. Activities Comm'n, 386 S.E.2d. 656, 658 (W. Va. 1989) (rejecting the association's blanket
application of the eight semester rule enacted to prevent red-shirting for athletic advantage);
Lambert v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 447 S.E.2d 901, 906 (W. Va 1994) (holding that the
Board of Education was required to provide a deaf high school basketball player signer during
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individualized analysis in cases arising under state human rights
laws.90
111. AN EVALUATION OF THE REASONABLENESS OF
ELIGIBILITY WAIVERS
Recently, in Kanongata'a v. Washington Athletic Association, the
Court denied the athletic association's motion for summary judgment
on the issue of whether the "hardship exception rule," as written, and
as applied to the student athlete violated the ADA.91 The associa-
tion's hardship exception to the four year limit on eligibility provides,
in pertinent part, "[t]o grant additional eligibility based on a hardship,
a student must demonstrate that normal progression towards gradua-
tion has been significantly interrupted as a result of either a long-con-
fining illness, an injury, a family hardship, and that the interruption
prevented the student from graduating in four (4) consecutive
her participation in the a school-sanctioned extracurricular activity of basketball, especially
where the Board had previously determined the student required a signer in her academic
classes).
90. See J.R. Traylor, III v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 1997 WL 833266 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 1997)
and Baisden v. West Virginia Secondary Sch. Activities Comm'n, 568 S.E.2d. 32 (W. Va. 2002)
(stating that an individualized approach to waiver determinations is consistent with the goals to
the West Virginia Human Rights Act, which stated in pertinent part that "reasonable accommo-
dations are reasonable modifications or adjustments to be determined on a case-byv-case ba-
sis. " emphasis added).
91. Kanongata'a v. Washington Interscholastic Activities Ass'n, 2006 WL 1727891 (W.D.
Wash.). Kanongata'a's academic career was disjointed, to say the least. He began attending
high school in 2001, at John F. Kennedy High School in Burien, Washington for ninth grade
(2001-02) and continued there for part of tenth grade (2002-03). At Kennedy, he played on the
junior varsity football and basketball teams in 2001-02, and on the junior varsity football team in
2002-03. During his time at Kennedy, Kanongata'a experienced numerous personal and familial
problems, including the death of his older brother in a car crash. Kanongata'a's grades gradually
deteriorated and by January 2003, he was expelled from school due to fighting, truancy, and
drinking at a school dance. Shortly thereafter, Kanongata'a was expelled from his family home
due to family conflicts. He then moved to Utah to live with an uncle, however Kanongata'a
never finished the remainder of his tenth grade year. He enrolled in school in Utah for 2003-04
school year, which should have been his junior year, but after the fall semester he dropped out.
He returned to Washington and enrolled in Bellevue High School during the 2003-04 spring
semester. In March 2004 he was suspended from Bellevue and placed at Robinswood, an alter-
native school in the Bellevue School District, and stayed there for the remainder of the 2003-04
school year. Kanongata'a again returned to Bellevue for the 2004-05 school year, which should
have been his senior year of high school, and participated in junior varsity football. In December
2004, Kanongata'a was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and in May
2005 the school district identified him as having a specific learning disability which qualified him
for an Individualized Education Plan. In January 2005, Kanongata'a was suspended from Belle-
vue for truancy and failing grades, and during the 2004-05 school year, Kanongata'a was alleg-
edly caught cheating a total of three times. Kanongata'a was placed at Robinswood during the
2005-06 school year, and sought eligibility to play on Bellevue's varsity football team because
Robinswood did not have one. *14.
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years." 9 2 The rule further states that a hardship waiver will not be
granted "if the student has the opportunity for four consecutive years
after entering or being eligible to enter the ninth grade to participate
in interscholastic activities."9 3 Though declining to making any find-
ings until the record could fully be developed at trial, the court never-
theless agreed with the student that the rule, as written, violated the
ADA: "Specifically, if a learning disability does not amount to an
'long-confining illness' or 'injury' there appears to be no room for a
learning-disabled student to obtain a hardship waiver under the rule
as drafted." 9 4 The court went on to find that even assuming the hard-
ship exception as written does not violate the ADA, its application in
the present case might have violated the ADA. 95 Thus, the court de-
termined that the student was entitled to present evidence, including
expert testimony, to support his claim that his learning disability
caused his poor academic performance, truancy, and behavioral
problems to a degree sufficient to warrant a waiver.96
Likewise, in Cruz v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Associa-
tion, Inc., the Court, in granting a permanent injunction, determined
that a waiver of the nineteen year old age limitation rule was reasona-
ble based on an individualized inquiry as to the essentiality of the age
rule.9 7 The Court held that the eligibility requirement was not essen-
tial namely because permitting the nineteen year old student to play
on the football team and the track team would not fundamentally al-
92. Id. at *14.
93. Id. The present dispute arose out of the WIAA's September 2005 eligibility hearing which
determined that Kanongata'a was ineligible to play both varsity and junior varsity football be-
cause Kanongata'a had participated for four consecutive years (2001-02 and 2002-03 at Kennedy;
2003-04 in Utah; and 2004-05 at Bellevue). The WIAA stated that "regardless of his actual par-
ticipation in football while in Utah in 2003-04, it was his opportunity to play that year that could
count against him." Not surprisingly, the WIAA also denied Kanongata'a petition for a hardship
exception based on family circumstances, specific learning disability, and ADHD. On appeal the
district court, in addition to reviewing the student's ADA claims de novo, reviewed the WIAA's
eligibility determination under the "'arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to law" standard, and
held that the four season year rule was both misinterpreted and misapplied to such a degree that
WIAA's actions was arbitrary and capricious. The district court found that the WIAA erred in
concluding that although Kanongata'a was ineligible for participation in Utah, he nevertheless
had the opportunity to participate: "WIAA's contention to the contrary is untenable, and appli-
cation of such a hyper-hypothetical interpretation of the word 'opportunity' is arbitrary and
capricious." Morevoer, the district court held that the WIAA's determination that Kanongata'a
did not qualify for a hardship waiver also was arbitrary and capricious.
94. Id. at *18. The court deferred a ruling on the validity of the waiver provision until other
relevant issues, such a whether the student was "qualified" and whether the accommodation was
"reasonable" had been decided.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Cruz v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 157 F. Supp. 2d. 485, 499-500 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
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ter the nature of the athletic association's interscholastic competi-
tion.98 In rejecting the association's argument that assessing the
competitive advantage that a 19-year-old may have over opponents is
unduly burdensome, the Court aptly noted that the association regu-
larly considers such complex determinations when granting waivers to
other eligibility requirements, such as the eight semester and transfer
rules.99
Most interscholastic athletic associations today include waiver pro-
visions in their bylaws. For example, the Ohio High School Athletic
Association bylaws condition the age limitation waiver for qualified
students under the ADA on the Commissioner's sole determination
that "(a) the student does not pose a safety risk to himself/herself or
others; and (b) the student does not enjoy any advantages in terms of
physical maturity, metal maturity or athletic maturity over other stu-
dent-athletes; and (c) the student's participation does not affect the
principles of competitive equity; and (d) the student's participation
does not displace another student-athlete; and (e) there is no evidence
of "red-shirting" or other indicia of academic dishonesty."
The prevalence of these waiver provisions casts doubts on the "un-
reasonableness" of such a practice. Thus, any arguments proffered by
school administrators that waiver determinations are unduly burden-
some are tenuous today.
IV. CONCLUSION
Inclusion in interscholastic athletics can have positive impact on the
social and emotional well-being of students with learning disabilities.
It has been noted that students with learning disabilities tend to ex-
hibit lower self esteem as compared to their typically developing
peers, and consequently, may be generally less accepted by students
without disabilities. 100 Researchers suggest that this lower social sta-
tus may be explained in two ways.'0 1 First, students with learning disa-
bilities who struggle academically may be characterized as being less
desirable classmates by their non-disabled peers who value scholastic
achievement.10 2 Second, students with learning disabilities often have
problems developing self competence, the ability to accurately re-
ceive, interpret, and respond to the subtleties of interpersonal interac-
98. Id. at 499.
99. Id. at 500.
100. FRIFNJ, supra note 4, at 177.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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tions.13 As result of poor social skills, these students may often have
difficulty initiating and maintaining relationships with their peers, and
may experience feelings of isolation. 104
Participation in interscholastic athletics certainly should combat
feeling of isolation and inferiority. As one commentator noted,
"[o]pportunities to develop leadership capabilities, teamwork, and
work ethic need to be given to persons with disabilities through inter-
action in athletic programs. . .[g]ames and sports should be based on
an athlete's personal attributes rather than on unnecessary adminis-
trative rules, coaches' attitudes, or other socially imposed barriers." tos
Moreover, researches suggest that where students exhibit salient in-
dicators of disengagement from school, preventive measures should
be implemented immediately to reduce the high risk for dropping out:
"Practices that more fully involve students with high-incidence disabil-
ities in decisions about their schooling may improve theses students'
feelings of belonging. Engagement should occur at various levels, in-
cluding involvement in IEP [individualized education plan] planning,
in extracurricular activities, and in relevant vocational training."10 6
Significantly, the Seventh Circuit in the Washington case rejected
the athletic association's argument that the district court committed
clear error in finding that the student would suffer irreparable harm
from a loss of academic motivation if he were declared ineligible.107
The Seventh Circuit relied on the testimony of the school psycholo-
gist, who when asked what the consequence would be if the student
were deemed ineligible replied: "I think it would be difficult.10 This
is a child who has been thoroughly frustrated academically, socially,
family problems from that, who now gets a taste of success, and then
we're going to pull that away from him? . . . I think it would be devas-
tating."109 The court found that the student's lack of self confidence
prevented him from achieving academic success and consequently,
103. Id.
104. Id. at 177-78. Other researchers identify learning disabled students with inadequate so-
cial skills as having nonverbal learning disabilities. Students with nonverbal learning disabilities
may read and speak fluently, but will nevertheless be ostracized in social situations because they
have difficulty interpreting such nonverbal communications as eye contact, facial expressions,
and posture.
105. Francis M. Kozub & David Porretta, Including Athletes with Disabilities Interscholastic
Benefit for All, 67 Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance 19, 20, 24 (March 1996).
106. Fulk, supra note 27.
107. 181 F.3d at 853.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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when he played basketball, an activity in which he excelled, his grades
improved. 10
Participation in extra-curricular athletic programs not only im-
proves the self-esteem and self-competence of students with disabili-
ties, but participation also furthers a larger goal-inclusion and
acceptance. Individuals with disabilities have historically been iso-
lated from mainstream society and have been subjected to invidious
discrimination. Offering all children positions on the same playing
field will break down the barriers and stereotypes that have precluded
individuals with disabilities from meaningful participation within the
community and the school-this should be a welcomed opportunity
for schools, not a burden.
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